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Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs for cartel partici-
pants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the
cartel’s victims will sue them. This apparent conflict between public and private an-
titrust enforcement has led to calls for a legal compromise. Our analysis shows that the
conflict is only due to poor legislation and that a compromise is not required: limiting
the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effec-
tiveness of a leniency program and may be counterproductive. We show that damage
actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil
liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to all evidence collected
by the competition authority, is granted to claimants. Our results help compare the EU
and US damage systems and directly question the 2014 EU Directive which tries to
protect the effectiveness of a leniency program by preventing the use of leniency state-
ments in subsequent actions for damages.
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1 Introduction
Anti-cartel enforcement is central to antitrust and is its crucial component in terms
of effects on a country’s productivity growth (Buccirossi et al. (2013)). Cartels, how-
ever, remain a widespread phenomenon with serious consequences to society and wel-
fare.1 Optimizing anti-cartel enforcement is therefore an important public policy issue.
Public and private competition law enforcement have complementary objectives
and, in general, tend to reinforce each other. However, a conflict between them may
arise in the fight against cartels. This conflict may be due to the central role played
by leniency programs (LPs) in cartel probes. LPs provide a fine reduction (up to im-
munity) to cartel members in exchange for reporting the cartel and further cooperation
with an investigation.
Private action for damages may jeopardize LPs since a leniency application in-
creases the risk of a successful damage action by the cartel’s victims. First, the evi-
dence provided by the leniency applicant may be used by the claimants to prove the
existence of the infringement and its effects. Second, leniency applicants, and espe-
cially immunity recipients, normally do not challenge in court the infringement deci-
sion adopted by the competition authority (CA), at least as far as the existence of the
cartel is concerned. Since the cartelists are joint and severally liable towards all the
cartel’s victims, the leniency applicant may become the preferred target of the damage
action for the entire harm caused by the cartel. Hence, the incentive stemming from the
avoidance of a fine may be counterbalanced by the increased risk of being condemned
to pay damages.
Two issues are particularly important in finding the right balance between public
enforcement and the protection of the LP on one side, and private enforcement and the
protection of the victims’ right to compensation on the other. The first issue is whether
leniency applicants (and in particular, the immunity recipient) should have the same
1See Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and Marshall and Marx (2012), among others.
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level and type of liability as all other cartelists. The second issue is whether access to
the leniency statements and related documents should be granted to the claimants in
the damage action.
These two issues have been addressed differently in various jurisdictions. In the US,
victims of an antitrust infringement are entitled to treble damages and cartel members
are jointly and severally liable for these damages. Moreover, the applicable discovery
rules allow claimants in a damage action to obtain full disclosure of all relevant docu-
ments, including those provided by the leniency applicants.2 In order to reduce the risk
of the effectiveness of the US LPs being undermined, the US Congress enacted the An-
titrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) in 2004. ACPERA
eliminates treble damages and joint liability for the amnesty recipient, who also has a
duty to cooperate with the claimants in the civil action. Hence, the cooperating party
is only exposed to single damages (detrebling), while the other conspirators will cover
the additional damages. ACPERA did not change the rules concerning the disclosure
of relevant documents so that claimants can still rely on the evidence provided by the
leniency applicants.
The recent EU Directive (European Commission (2014)) disciplines the matter in
the EU.3 With regards to liability, the Directive provides “that an immunity recipient
is jointly and severally liable as follows: (a) to its direct or indirect purchasers or
providers; and (b) to other injured parties only where full compensation cannot be
obtained from the other undertakings that were involved in the same infringement of
competition law” (Art. 11(4)).
With regards to access to documents submitted by a leniency applicant (not only
the immunity recipient), the Directive provides that “national courts cannot at any time
order a party or a third party to disclose any of the following categories of evidence:
(a) leniency statement; and (b) settlement submissions.” (Art. 6(6)). Moreover, article
2Note that, while judges do not request the leniency documents from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
they can subpoena the firms and obtain all of the evidence a firm provided the DOJ with.
3The Directive is still to be transposed in the national legislations.
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7(1) provides that “Member States shall ensure that evidence in the categories listed
in Article 6(6) which is obtained by a natural or legal person solely through access to
the file of a competition authority is either deemed to be inadmissible in actions for
damages or is otherwise protected under the applicable national rules”.
A rather interesting measure was adopted in Hungary in 20094, pre-directive, where
the immunity applicant can be called on to compensate the cartel’s victims if and only
if the other cartel members are unable to pay the damages awarded to the claimants.
The protection granted to the immunity recipient does not prevent the access to the
information and evidence provided to the competition authority.
For simplicity, in the following we will refer to the three legal regimes described
above as the US, the EU and the Hungarian solutions.
In this paper we theoretically analyze the interaction between these rules and the
effectiveness of leniency programs in terms of the effects on general deterrence. Our
theoretical analysis also allows us to examine whether the US, EU, and Hungarian so-
lutions are appropriate, taking into consideration both the objective of preserving (or
improving) the effectiveness of the LP and the objective of guaranteeing the right to
compensation of the cartel’s victims. We investigate whether pursuing the primary
goal of the public enforcement system, i.e. achieving an optimal level of deterrence of
anticompetitive conducts, necessarily requires sacrificing the amount of damages that
claimants can expect to recover, or whether, these two objectives can both be pursued
in a consistent and complementary way, and if so to what extent and how. We focus
on leniency awarded to parties that spontaneously report the cartel when the CA is un-
aware of its existence, since this type of leniency has unambiguously positive effects
on deterrence, as long as sanctions are robust.5
In Spagnolo (2004), it is shown that, in order to maximize deterrence in the pres-
ence of a leniency program, it is optimal to minimize the amount of damages paid by
4Art.88D of the Hungarian Competition Act (1996), revised in 2009.
5On the contrary, leniency awarded when the CA is already aware of the cartel’s existence has ambiguous
effects (see Motta and Polo (2003)).
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the first (and only the first) reporting firm. However, how much information from the
leniency report has to be disclosed in the civil action and the right of victims to be
compensated were not taken into account. Here, we extend Spagnolo (2004) to include
these two additional elements. We determine the optimal combination of damage lia-
bility of the reporting firm and the amount of information which should be accessible
to the claimants (which includes leniency statements), both in terms of deterrence and
of the ability of victims to be compensated.
We find that, normally, there is no conflict between the two objectives, contrary
to what is presumed in the legal debate. To maximize the attractiveness of the le-
niency program and deterrence, it is optimal to a) minimize the amount of damages
the leniency applicant is liable for, and b) maximize the share of information collected
by the competition authority and made accessible to the claimants, including leniency
statements. Hence, we suggest a legal regime in which the immunity recipient’s lia-
bility is reduced as much as possible (and possibly eliminated) and full access to the
leniency statements is granted to the claimants in the ensuing damage actions. In the
following this regime is referred to as “our proposal”.
When we examine expected damages to be awarded, we find that as long as com-
petitors are able to jointly cover the damages caused by the leniency applicant, our pro-
posal is also optimal, as it maximizes the possibility for victims to obtain compensation
for harm. In the EU, claimants are worse-off under the new Directive in comparison
with both the previous legal system and the legal system that would result from our
proposal. The latter dominates both the other systems and maximizes deterrence. The
US solution is also suboptimal. It can be improved by granting the amnesty recipient
full immunity on civil liability. The Hungarian solution instead works well since, if
there is no risk of bankruptcy, it is in fact equivalent to our proposal.
We also examine strategic risk (the fear of being betrayed by a partner applying for
leniency) as a deterrence channel, and extend the model to include the cost of being the
5
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preferred target of the damage actions. We find that both these factors further increase
the efficiency gain of our proposal.
Finally, we consider the case in which cartel members’ assets suffice to pay awarded
damages only if the first leniency applicant is not kept immune from its civil liability.
In this situation a possible conflict between deterrence and victims’ rights for com-
pensation may emerge. We show that, in this scenario, the Hungarian solution can be
considered a “second best” which maximizes deterrence under the constraint of hold-
ing the value of expected liquidated damages constant.
In our analysis we emphasize that the right to compensation of the potential victims
of cartels that are deterred should be more explicitly taken into account than what was
done in the current debate. Then it becomes clear that deterrence, the effectiveness of
public enforcement, must “matter more” than the right of actual victims to obtain com-
pensation. Deterrence prevents the allocative inefficiency brought about by cartels, and
at the same time it also ensures that the potential victims of the deterred cartels obtain
“full compensation”, as that harm is directly prevented. If we think that distributive
considerations are irrelevant and only efficiency should matter, then there would be no
reason for granting a right to be compensated to the victims of actual cartels, unless
this right positively contributed to the efficiency goal through deterrence. As a conse-
quence, the right to be compensated should always be limited whenever it reduces the
deterrence properties of the enforcement system. If instead we think that distributive
considerations are also important, then we have to place the same weight on the welfare
of the actual victims of undeterred and detected cartels and of customers of potential
cartels that do not form because of increased deterrence. In both cases, deterrence
considerations and the right of actual victims to obtain compensation cannot be given
the same status, as sometimes done in the current debate. We see clarifying this as an
important contribution of our paper. Indeed, if we take into account the interest of all
actual and potential victims, then our proposal (i.e. full protection from liability for the
6
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leniency applicant) is likely to perform even better than the Hungarian solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this paper
to the relevant economic and legal literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model.
Section 4 discusses some extensions of the basic model: 1) deterrence linked to strate-
gic risk; 2) the impact of being the preferred target in damage actions; and 3) the risk
of bankruptcy. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
The possible conflict between public and private enforcement has originated a long
and ongoing debate. In the EU, this culminated with the recently approved Directive.6
In this section, we review this legal debate and then the economic literature on the
trade-off between public and private enforcement.
2.1 The recent legal debate
Before the adoption of the Directive, the issues of liability of the immunity appli-
cant and access to leniency statements, were dealt with by applying some general legal
principles.
The first relevant principle, as stated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the
Manfredi (2006)7 and Courage (2001)8 judgements, is that the victims of an antitrust
infringement have a right to be fully compensated for the harm they suffered. If a more
favorable treatment of a leniency applicant with respect to its civil liability hindered the
effective exercise of this right to a full compensation, it would run against this principle.
As for the access to the leniency statements, in a judgement concerning a referral from
6For a complete survey on private and public enforcement of antitrust law see Segal and Whinston (2006).
7Judgement of the Court of Justice of 13 Jul. 2006, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, ECR
I-6619.
8Judgement of the Court of Justice of 20 Sept. 2001, Case C-453/99, Courage, ECR I-6297.
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the district court of Bonn in Germany (Pfleiderer case)9 the ECJ ruled that EU law does
not prohibit a third party, who has been adversely affected by a breach of competition
law, from having access to a leniency application by the infringer. The court held that
it is for the national judge to determine the conditions under which access to leniency
material can be granted to someone seeking to obtain damages. According to the ECJ,
the national judge would need to take into account and weigh all the interests protected
by EU law, namely the need to ensure the effectiveness of leniency programs and to
support antitrust damage actions.10 This position has been confirmed in the more recent
Donau Chemie judgement,11 where the ECJ affirmed that national courts must balance
these possibly conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration
all the relevant facts of the case.
The legal debate has been active regarding the coexistence of private and public
enforcement (Shavell (1997), Lande and Davis (2011) and Bernard (2012)) and the in-
teraction between leniency programs and damage claims.
More closely related to the question posed in this paper are the papers by Komni-
nos (2011), Cauffman (2011) and MacCulloch and Wardhaugh (2012), which describe
the relationship between leniency programs and damage claims. While Cauffman
(2011) and MacCulloch and Wardhaugh (2012) suggest that the effectiveness of le-
niency should prevail and, therefore, the reports should not be disclosed, Komninos
(2011) proposes a case-by-case approach. In addition, Komninos (2011) and Cauff-
man (2011) suggest that the reporting firm should have further limited liability. These
proposals are somewhat in line with what has been approved in the new Directive. Two
other papers examine the Directive itself. In line with the results of our formal analysis,
Kortmann and Wesseling (2013) and Geradin and Grelier (2013) view the Directive as
being flawed in the sense that the liability of immunity recipients should be further
9Judgement of 14 June 2011 in the case C-360/09.
10On 30 January 2012, the German court which had brought the case before the ECJ concluded that access
to leniency documents should be denied.
11Case C-536/11 – Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others.
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reduced.
2.2 Economic literature
Shavell (1997) was one of the first to explore the differences between the social and
private incentives to litigate from a legal perspective. The author argues that achieving
a number of litigations which is neither socially excessive nor socially inadequate re-
quires corrective social policies and the guarantee that the claimants have more knowl-
edge than the public regulators have or could possibly obtain. The author points out
that low litigation costs allow more plaintiffs to access justice but encourages them
to sue firms even in cases where the social costs exceed the social benefits and, ac-
cording to Bourjade et al. (2009), where lawsuits are poorly founded. Bourjade et al.
(2009) study, theoretically, the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of EU
competition law by developing a model of litigation and settlement with information
asymmetry. The authors conclude that it is better to increase damages than to reduce
the cost of suing.
McAfee et al. (2008) develop a theoretical model which compares private and pub-
lic enforcement and find that, if the courts resolve with a low error level, then only
legitimate suits are submitted and the optimal solution is the conjunction of public and
private enforcement. This is because private parties have a better signal of the violation
than the public agency. The authors assume that neither private nor public entities can
commit and that public entities aim to maximize social welfare. In this scenario, they
propose a system where private claimants pay a subsidy for public investigation in ex-
change for a monetary award following a conviction.
More directly relevant to this paper is Spagnolo (2004), showing that in order to
maximize deterrence an optimal leniency program minimizes (eliminates) the liability
for damages of the first spontaneously reporting firm (only), a proposal supported also
by some practitioners (see e.g. Green and McCall (2009)). This paper is therefore also
9
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related to the recent but extensive literature on the economics of leniency programs,
starting with the contributions by Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Aubert
et al. (2006), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006), Harrington (2008), Harrington (2013),
Chen and Rey (2013) and many others.12
3 A simple model
We try to develop the simplest possible model from which to rigorously derive our
results. This is both because our results are very intuitive - although only a formal
analysis allows to verify their robustness; and because we hope to reach the widest
possible audience, including the legal and policy domains.
Consider an economy composed of a continuum of industries. In each industry, two
symmetric firms produce a homogeneous good and repeatedly play a Bertrand game in
the infinite, discrete time. Firms may choose to enter a collusive agreement to maintain
a high price and escape the poor competitive outcome. If they do, and respect the
agreement, each of them earns (at most) collusive profits Π per period.
In each industry, firms share the same discount factor δ. However, each industry
has a different discount factor, for example because of different frequency of market
interactions, and the different industry discount factors are uniformly distributed in the
interval ( 12 , 1)
13, so that collusion is sustainable in every industry.
We assume that to reach a collusive agreement firms need to communicate, that hard
and compromising evidence is produced only after both firms agree to collude, and that
this evidence, available to cartel members, can also be found by a CA that investigates
the industry. If a cartel forms between the two symmetric firms, the likelihood that the
CA investigates, finds evidence on the collusive agreement and successfully prosecutes
the cartel members without any of them cooperating with the investigation (revealing
12Marvão and Spagnolo (2015) offer a review of the empirical and experimental evidence of the effective-
ness of leniency programs.
13With δ < 12 collusion is not sustainable, independently of antitrust enforcement.
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information) is ρ, with 0 < ρ < 1. A leniency program (LP) is in place, encouraging
cartel members to self-report such hard evidence before any such investigation.
If a cartel is convicted because of an independent investigation by the CA, each
member must pay a fine F that, for simplicity, we assume is exogenously given, as in
most previous analysis. If a cartel is convicted because one of the firms reported the
hard information within the LP, the reporting firm pays no fines while the other pays
the full fine F. If both parties self-report, each of them pays half of the fine.
In each period, the timing of the game is therefore as follows:
• Stage 1: Each firm chooses whether to enter into a collusive agreement. If at least
one firm chooses not to collude, then competition “à la Bertrand” takes place and
the game ends for that period. The competitive Nash equilibrium generates zero
profits for both firms. Otherwise:
• Stage 2: Each of the firms chooses whether to respect the agreement and “col-
lude”, quoting the agreed upon price, or to deviate from it, undercutting the
agreed upon price. Firms can also choose whether to apply to the LP and report
the cartel to the CA. If at least one of the firms applies, the game ends for the
period. Otherwise:
• Stage 3: Quoted prices become public information. Firms choose whether to
apply for the LP and report the cartel to the CA. If at least one of the firms
applies to the LP, the game ends for the period. Otherwise:
• Stage 4: The CA chooses which industries to investigate, ρ realizes, and the
game ends for the period.
The figure below shows a graphical representation of the stage game.
11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566774









































In addition to fines, cartel members are liable for compensation of buyers. The
maximum amount of estimated damages for each firm is D, so that the maximum
amount of damages for which the cartel is liable is 2D. The fraction of these maxi-
mum total damages that each convicted firm will have to pay, depends on the liability
rules defined by the legislation in the various situations. The amount of damages that
convicted firms expect to pay will also depend on the amount of information available
to victims after the conviction, denoted by α, with 0 < α < 1.
We will start by analyzing the effects of different liability and disclosure rules on
deterrence and on victims’ expected compensation under the assumption that there is
no risk of bankruptcy, in the sense that each firm is solvent for its own direct damages
and non-reporting cartel members have sufficient assets to jointly cover the damages
caused by the cartel, including those caused by the leniency applicant. While we be-
lieve this assumption captures the current situation well, particularly for large cartels,
we will also discuss what happens if it is not satisfied. For simplicity, it is also assumed
that firms do not appeal decisions.
We can denote the amount of damages a given firm is liable for by DNR if no firm
applies to the LP; by DR if the firm applies to the LP but the other cartel member does
not; DOR if only the other cartel member applies and reports the cartel; and DBR if both
12
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do. In the US and in the EU solutions, we have that 0 < DR ≤ DNR. In the Hungar-
ian solution DR = 0 if there is no risk of bankruptcy by the non-reporting firm and
0 < DR ≤ DNR otherwise.
The expected total damages that firms have to pay are a function of the amount of
information available to victims, after a cartel is convicted, to use when suing for dam-
ages in each case. We denote the amount of this information by αNR if no firm reports
under the LP (or if the leniency statement cannot be disclosed), and αR if at least one
firm reports, with αR ≥ αNR.
As mentioned in the introduction, the EU solution restricts disclosure of leniency
statements, thereby setting αR = αNR. In the US and the Hungarian solutions αR ≥ αNR
as the applicable rules do not affect the claimants’ ability to use the evidence provided
by the leniency applicants in the damages actions. Our proposal is instead to do the
opposite, that is, set DR = 0 and maximize αR.
3.2 Analysis
To sustain collusion, agents use a grim-trigger strategy, which is reversion to a
permanent competitive Nash equilibrium, in case of deviation. The environment is sta-
tionary, so if no deviation is observed, firms continue to collude after they are convicted
by a random investigation by the CA.14 A firm that deviates by undercutting price also
finds it optimal to apply to the LP at the same stage (Stage 2). Firms can therefore
sustain a stationary collusive agreement in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the
expected gains from respecting the collusive agreement and not reporting are larger
than the expected discounted gains from optimally deviating and reporting under the
LP.
If firms choose not to report, they will earn in each period, a net profit of Π mi-
nus the expected penalty (F + αNRD). However, if a firm deviates and simultaneously
14This is as in Chen and Rey (2013). The results would not change if we assumed that collusion would
stop, temporarily or permanently, after a successful conviction of the cartel linked to a random investigation,
without any deviation from the cartel partners.
13
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reports, while the other firm complies, it will earn profits of 2Π and it will receive im-
munity from fines (F = 0), although it will still be liable for damages to the amount of
αRDR. The expected discount values of reporting (R) and not reporting (NR) are then:
VNR(C,C) =
Π − ρ(F + αNRD)
1 − δ
VR(R,C) = 2Π − 0 − αRDR
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) below, determines the minimum dis-
count factor δ necessary for collusion to be sustainable in equilibrium:
VNR − VR > 0↔ δ > δ ≡ 1 −
Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)
2Π − αRDR
(1)
Since collusion is sustainable in equilibrium only in those industries where δ > δ,
an increase in δ increases cartel deterrence, as it directly reduces the number of indus-
tries that satisfy the condition for collusion to be an equilibrium.
It can be easily seen that when αRDR decreases, δ increases. Therefore, in the
presence of a leniency program which provides the first applicant with immunity from
fines, and with private enforcement in the form of damage claims, to maximize deter-
rence in terms of the number of industries in which no collusive equilibrium exists,
αRDR should be set at its minimum level. Since αR belongs in the interval (αNR, 1),
the minimal level of αRDR = 0 can only be achieved by limiting leniency applicants’
liability, setting DR = 0 as we suggest.
By reducing the amount of information victims can access and use in private dam-
age suits (in particular, leniency statements), setting αR = αNR, as is done in the EU
solution, can never lead to maximal deterrence. Similarly, the legal regime determined
in the US solution leads to a level of deterrence that is below the maximum that can
be achieved through a more generous LP. The Hungarian solution, instead, is optimal
14
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if there is no risk of bankruptcy as assumed in this basic version of the model, because
DR is effectively zero.
Proposition 1: The effectiveness of the leniency program, in terms of deterrence, is
strictly smaller under the EU solution or under the US solution than under our pro-
posal and the Hungarian solution.
The various policies are also not equivalent regarding the possibility of victims to
obtain compensation for harm. In particular, we compare the EU solution and our
proposal. In equilibrium, no cartel is formed that is subsequently reported. However,
suppose that unexpected trembles in the discount factor of firms may occur. A suffi-
ciently large tremble downwards would lead to a violation of the ICC, inducing that
firm to deviate and apply for leniency. Under our policy, the amount of total damages
expected by victims as compensation is αR2D. Under the EU solution, since αR = αNR,
it would be αNR2D < αR2D.
An alternative way of looking at the effect of these policies on the right of compen-
sation of victims (both aware and unaware) is to evaluate the amount of damages which
is left uncompensated. Suppose there is an unexpected change in the legal regime,
which creates a shift in the discount factor from δ to δ′ > δ. Assume this change im-
plements our proposal, thus replacing the EU solution.
In industries where δ′ > δ > δ, the increase in δ leads cartels to collapse, report
and pay a fraction (αR) of the damages. The total of uncompensated damages in these
industries is given by (δ′−δ)(1−αR)2D, which is zero in our proposal. In the remaining
industries, with δ > δ′, cartels survive and the loss in damages is given by (1 − δ′)2D.
With the EU solution, the amount of uncompensated damages was 2D(1−δ). It follows
that our proposal reduces the amount of uncompensated damages by 2D[δ′ − δ]. It is
immediate to see that this result holds true also for the US solution.
15
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Proposition 2: The effectiveness of the leniency program, in terms of the ability of
victims to obtain compensation and in terms of the loss in non-compensated cartel
damages, is strictly smaller under the EU or US solutions than under our proposal.
4 Extensions
In this section, we discuss how our previous results change when we take into
account strategic risk, being the preferred of damage actions and the possibility of
bankruptcy.
4.1 Strategic risk
It is natural that each firm considers the possibility of being betrayed by the other
cartel member. A collusive agreement, to be viable, also requires that firms trust each
other, i.e. that they have sufficient confidence that co-conspirators will respect the
agreement and will not get “cold feet” and report the cartel so as to obtain a lenient
treatment.
Leslie (2004) argued, from a legal point of view, that it is important to take into
account distrust among cartel members, the fear of being reported by a co-conspirator,
as a source of deterrence. Spagnolo (2004) formally showed that this fear constitutes
an additional deterrence channel for collaborative crimes, by introducing the concept
of strategic risk to capture it formally, and that - cœteris paribus - a well designed and
run LP (i.e. “strict”, as in limited to the first spontaneously reporting party, and with
powerful incentives, e.g. high fines for non-reporting parties) can strongly increase
cartel deterrence by increasing this fear.15 Bigoni et al. (2015) provide experimental
evidence on the power of this novel deterrence channel for collaborative crimes, show-
15The game theoretic foundations of this concept have been developed in Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski
and Spagnolo (2015). Additional experimental evidence of the importance of this type of strategic risk was
found by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), Blonski et al. (2011) and Bigoni et al. (2014) and Breitmoser (2015).
16
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ing that cartel formation falls dramatically when a (strict) LP is introduced, even when
the probability that the cartel is independently detected by the CA when nobody reports
under the LP, is zero.16
In this section, we take into account this novel deterrence channel and check whether
and how the results of the previous section change in its light.
The simplest way to take into account the effect of strategic risk on an agent’s
choice regarding whether or not to form a cartel is to see it as an equilibrium selection
criterion. When collusion satisfies the ICC, the game has multiple equilibria - collusive
and competitive ones. Strategic risk points at equilibria that are less “risky”, i.e. where
the consequences of the opponent not playing the equilibrium strategy (“deviating”)
are less negative. It trades off equilibrium gains and losses if the opponent defects, and
tells us which equilibrium is likely to be selected in different environments. The col-
lusive equilibrium is more profitable than the competitive one, but it exposes the firm
to the risk of being “cheated upon”, a particularly costly event in the presence of a LP,
as a deviating opponent will then also report the cartel to the CA. We can then derive a
minimum level of the discount factor δ∗ necessary for the higher strategic risk of col-
lusive equilibrium to be dominated by higher expected profits so that subjects choose
to collude. The minimum discount factor necessary for firms to choose the collusive
equilibrium rather than the reporting one will of course always be strictly larger than
that necessary for a collusive equilibrium to exist in the first place, as defined by the
ICC (i.e. δ∗ > δ).
To derive δ∗, we use the best response equivalent matrix to calculate the “Nash
products” of the two pure strategy equilibria, as shown in the Appendix. Collusion is
16A more recent experiment by Chowdhury and Wandschneider (2014) confirms the robustness of this
result. For an overview of available empirical and experimental evidence on the effects of leniency programs,
see Marvão and Spagnolo (2015).
17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566774
risk dominated by reporting when:
δ < δ∗ ≡ 1 −
Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)
3Π + F2 + α
R(DOR − DBR − DR)
Given that it is always the case that δ∗ > δ, maximizing deterrence while taking
into account strategic risk considerations amounts to maximizing δ∗. The comparative
statics of δ∗, also derived in the Appendix, prove the following.
Lemma 1: Taking into account strategic risk (the fear of betrayal), cartel deterrence is:
a) decreasing in DR;
b) increasing in DOR; and
c) increasing in αR if DR < D2 and decreasing in α
R if DR > D2 .
Also taking strategic risk also account changes our previous conclusions in two
ways. First, it highlights the fact that minimizing DR is not only important for increas-
ing the incentives to defect (Lemma 1a), but also because it automatically increases the
liability of firms that do not report DOR (Lemma 1b). This worsens the consequences
and increases the fear that if you choose to collude, your partner may report you under
the LP. Second, it shows that for full disclosure to maximize the effectiveness of car-
tel deterrence, the liability of the party reporting under the LP must be reduced more
than it was suggested by the ICC in the previous section. The optimal policy in terms
of the effectiveness of the LP, however, does not change, nor do the consequences for
the ability of victims to claim damages. It can also be shown that the EU and the US
solutions lead to a further loss of efficiency.17 We can therefore state the following.
Proposition 3: Taking into account strategic risk (the fear of being reported), the ef-
17Proof in the Appendix 6.3.
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fectiveness of the leniency program, in terms of cartel deterrence and the ability of the
victims to obtain compensation when a cartel is reported, remains strictly smaller un-
der the EU and the US solutions than under a policy that further reduces liability for the
first firm that reports under the leniency program and maximizes information disclo-
sure to victims, giving full access to leniency statements for private actions. Moreover,
the efficiency loss implied by the EU and the US solutions is larger than that implied
by the ICC and Proposition 1.
4.2 Preferred target
In the previous sections, the model does not take into account the incentives of
lawyers to target a specific cartel member in the action for damages. Let T denote the
cost of being the preferred target of the action for damages. If neither or both firms
report, then this cost is equally divided between the cartel members ( T2 ).
When only one firm reports, in the EU solution (scenario II), both firms have the
same probability of being the target of the damage action and each supports half of the
cost ( T2 ). Before the recent Directive (scenario I), the reporter was the preferred target,
supporting all the cost (T). In our solution (scenario III), the reporter has a lower lia-
bility for damages and the non-reporting cartel member supports the full cost (T).
Taking T into account, we calculate new expressions for the discount factors and
we compute comparative statics on the discount factors in the three scenarios (proofs
and derivations can be found in the Appendix). It can be shown that the difference
between the discount factors of scenarios III and II is increasing in T . This means that
the efficiency gain of the proposal over the EU solution is larger when T is taken into
account:
∂[δ∗(III)(T ) − δ∗(II)(T )]
∂T
=
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Proposition 4: Taking into account the cost of the claimant’s choice of the preferred
target of damage claims further increases the loss of deterrence implied by the EU
solution (II) relative to the optimal policy (III).
4.3 Bankruptcy
Another relevant extension of our model is to consider a setting where firms may
go bankrupt. In this extension, we consider the simple case in which each firm indi-
vidually has assets (W) that are insufficient to pay the fine and the awarded damages if
the cartel is uncovered by the CA under its own initiative or if the cartel is uncovered
because the other cartelist reported it to the CA. In this setting, a firm that does not
cooperate with the CA goes bankrupt if the cartel is detected and is condemned to pay
damages. However, we assume that if both firms are liable towards the victims, their
total assets (2W) are sufficient to pay both the sanctions and damages. We further as-
sume that if a firm goes bankrupt it is immediately replaced by another identical firm,
so that the competitive conditions in the market do not change. We focus only on the
incentive compatibility constraint.18
The analysis is straightforward. If firms do not report in each period, with probabil-
ity (1 − ρ) each of them obtains Π and with probability ρ the cartel is caught by the CA




1 − (1 − ρ) δ
Π
The expected discounted value of reporting does not change with respect to the
18However, our conclusions remain valid if we take into account strategic risk considerations.
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previous analysis, and is therefore:
VR (R,C) = 2Π − αRDR







and it is clearly decreasing in αRDR, so that Proposition 1 is unaffected.
However, Proposition 2 does not necessarily hold anymore. Indeed, if we pose
DR = 0 (i.e. claimants cannot ask for compensation to the reporting firm), the value
of damages which are liquidated is W − F. This corresponds to the value of the non-
reporting firm’s assets that remain after the payment of the sanction, whereas they
would obtain a total compensation equal to 2αRD if the reporting firm is also asked
to repay damages. By assumption, W < F + αRDOR and, since when DR = 0 then
DOR = 2D, we have that W − F < 2αRD.
We can conclude that, if our proposal is implemented, the victims of those cartels
that are not deterred and that are uncovered due to the LP might be worse off than under
the legal regime envisaged by the EU and the US solutions.
However, even in this case, we can still say that the EU and the US solutions de-
termine a suboptimal regime, as the Hungarian solution dominates them. This is easy
to show. The critical discount factor is monotonically decreasing in αRDR. Hence,
optimal deterrence is achieved at a corner solution that depends on the constraint we
pose on αRDR, beyond the non-negativity constraint. Suppose that this constraint fol-
lows the policy objective of allowing the victims of cartels uncovered through a LP to
obtain the same level of compensation that they can obtain under the US or the EU
solutions under any possible circumstance. Now, we can have two possible situations.
In the first, the non-reporting firm has sufficient assets to pay damages. In this case,
21
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the optimal (corner) solution is αRDR = 0. This entails DR = 0, whereas both in the
EU and in the US solution DR > 0. The second possible situation is that in which the
non-reporting firm has insufficient assets to pay the level of damages that would result
under the alternative solutions, that is W −F < 2αNRD. In this case, the optimal corner
solution is to set αR = αNR and DR = 2D−(W−F). Hence, to maximize deterrence, un-
der the constraint defined above, we can set αR = αNR and DR = max(0, 2D− (W −F)).
This solution is a fairly good representation of the Hungarian rules, at least as far as
the liability of the immunity recipient is concerned.
Proposition 5: If firms may be unable to compensate the cartel’s victims without the
contribution of the immunity recipient, the EU and the US solutions are strictly domi-
nated by the Hungarian solution (i.e., the leniency recipient only becomes liable if all
other cartel members go bankrupt).
The above discussion shows that when there is a risk of firms’ bankruptcy, a trade-
off might exist between the deterrence objective and that of allowing cartels’ victims to
obtain full redress. In this case, the Hungarian rules on the civil liability of the immu-
nity recipient may seem a good compromise. However, we can say something more,
even if we restrict our attention to customers’ welfare and leave aside any allocative
efficiency considerations that would strongly suggest focusing only on the deterrence
properties of the enforcement system. Indeed, the trade-off between deterrence and
victims’ compensation can be represented, in the customers’ welfare space, as a trade-
off between the welfare of the customers of potential cartels that do not form because
they are effectively deterred, and the welfare of the customers of actual cartels that are
uncovered due to an LP and subsequently obtain damages. As far as we know, nobody
has ever argued that the welfare of actual victims is more important that the welfare of
potential victims, and we cannot see what arguments could ever be used in favor of this
22
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proposition. So, if the welfare of actual victims and that of potential ones is equally
important, we should not be satisfied with a “second best” solution. In particular, we
can check whether, or under which conditions, adopting our proposal rather than the
Hungarian solution would make cartels’ victims in general better off.
To make this assessment, let us assume that all cartels (actual and potential) cause
the same level of harm to consumers (D) and, for the sake of this analysis, assume that
the level of awarded damages (αR) is the same in both legal regimes when a cartel is
uncovered through a leniency application. The two solutions are equivalent if the as-
sets of each (would-be) cartelist are sufficient to pay the fine and the awarded damages.
Hence, we can restrict attention to the case in which victims can obtain the awarded
damages only if the leniency applicant is held liable. In this case, our proposed solution
deters more cartels but reduces the level of compensation obtained by the victims of
actual cartels. Hence, we can define its consequences in the consumer welfare space as
a benefit and a cost.
The benefit is the avoided consumer harm of the potential cartels that do not occur
due to increased deterrence; the cost is the portion of consumer harm that is not com-
pensated because the immunity recipient is not required to pay damages. Therefore,
the benefit is:
(F(δ′) − F(δH))D
where δ′ is the critical discount factor when our proposal is implemented, δH is the
critical discount factor when the Hungarian solution is in place, and F is the cumulative
distribution function of firms’ actual discount factor, δ. The cost, instead, is:
(1 − F(δ′))βλαRD
where β is the fraction of undeterred cartels that are then reported by a leniency appli-
cant, λ is the fraction of awarded damages that will not covered by the other cartelists,
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and αR is the portion of actual damages that is awarded by a court.
Our model does not allow us to say that the benefit of our proposal always exceeds
its cost. This issue might be addressed empirically. However, we think that there are
good reasons to believe that the benefit of our proposal is larger than its cost. First and
foremost, customers of a potential but deterred cartel save the entire harm that the car-
tel would cause them (D), whereas those of an actual cartel are usually able to recover
only a fraction of the harm they suffered. This is especially true if we consider that
damage repayment is uncertain and takes time, and that civil action entails costs that
are rarely fully reimbursed by the losing party. Therefore, αR might be relatively low.
Second, we are not aware of cases, at least in Europe, in which a damage action has
determined the failure of one or more condemned defendants. From this, we can infer
that the fraction of awarded damages that will not be paid if the immunity recipient is
not liable (λ) is likely to be extremely low. Third, if the immunity recipient is granted
immunity also on civil grounds, we suspect that the LP may become a tremendously
powerful deterrence mechanism, so that the fraction of undeterred cartels (1 − F(δ′))
is likely to be relatively low. Fourth, we have no evidence to say how many undeterred
cartels fall apart because one of the members reports the cartel to a CA. What we can
say is that in a stationary model such as ours, this number is zero (so that β is zero)
because either the cartel is deterred or, if not deterred, is not reported.
All these considerations make us quite confident that our proposal would outper-
form the Hungarian solution if we give equal weight to the welfare of the actual victims
of uncovered cartels and the welfare of the customers of potential cartels that do not
occur because of increased deterrence.
4.4 Other extensions
An extension which is likely to increase the appropriateness of our suggested solu-
tion is to increase the number of cartel members. Keeping all else equal, an increase
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in the number of competing firms should increase the risk that some other firms would
take advantage of the LP and report the cartel’s existence. Hence, the LP may be
rendered extremely effective if the first applicant is further “rewarded” with a civil li-
ability immunity, as the risk that a competitor would be lured by this reward increases
exponentially with the number of active and colluding firms.
5 Conclusions
Does the pursuit of the primary goal of the public enforcement system, i.e. achiev-
ing an optimal level of deterrence of anticompetitive conducts, necessarily requires the
amount of damages that claimants can expect to recover to be sacrificed? In this paper,
we examine whether the solutions adopted by the EU and the US are the most appro-
priate ones, taking both objectives into consideration.
The position of the ECJ summarized in Section 2 has the merit of clarifying that ac-
tions for damages initiated by the victims of an antitrust infringement may increase the
level of deterrence. In this respect, public and private enforcement are not in conflict
with each other. However, as far as hardcore cartels are concerned, the public interest
has been pursued in many jurisdictions through the adoption of LPs. The legal debate
has been centered on the question of whether damage actions can jeopardize the effec-
tiveness of these programs. In our view, the legal debate has taken for granted that an
inherent conflict exists between the proper functioning of an LP and private damage
claims, so that any proper legislation necessarily implies a compromise between the
interest of the public enforcement system and the interest of private cartel victims to be
fully compensated. The recently adopted EU Directive on damage actions follows this
path. Our analysis shows that a compromise is not actually needed: we do not have to
limit the ability of cartel victims to recover their losses to preserve the effectiveness of
an LP. In fact, damage actions can even improve the effectiveness of such programs.
The simple theoretical model discussed in the previous sections shows that as far
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as the incentive compatibility constraint is concerned, the optimal solution is to limit
as far as possible the risk for the immunity recipient to be condemned to pay damages,
through reducing its level of liability. This maintains the deterrence properties of an
LP implied by the incentive compatibility constraint. The EU Directive partially limits
this liability, but it also limits the information that is available to the claimants. These
two instruments (lowering the liability of the immunity recipients and restricting the
available information) have different effects on deterrence and on the victims’ ability
to be fully compensated. Indeed, given that all cartelists are jointly and severally li-
able towards all of the cartel’s victims, reducing the level of liability of the immunity
recipient does not affect the amount of damages they can obtain. In contrast, limiting
the evidence they can use in the damage action will certainly reduce the expected value
of the final compensation. Hence, if we want to give concrete application to the legal
principle that any victim has the right to be fully compensated, the best solution would
be to grant complete access to all documents submitted by the immunity applicant and
restrict (and possibly eliminate) the civil liability of the immunity recipient.
The US legislation is not optimal either, because it only detrebles damages for the
successful amnesty applicant who, therefore, remains liable for single damages. The
solution adopted in Hungary (which unfortunately is bound to be abandoned in favor
of the EU Directive) is optimal when there is no risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, limiting
the immunity applicant’s civil liability will significantly reduce its incentive to disclose
only the information that is strictly necessary for a successful leniency application and
strategically avoid disclosing any information that would facilitate the hard work that
the cartel’s victims have to undertake when they claim damages.
Deterrence not only depends on the cartelists’ incentives to deviate (and report), but
also on the riskiness of continuing to collude. Recent laboratory evidence confirms that
strategic risk is the main driver of deterrence. Our analysis shows that once risk domi-
nance considerations enter the picture, our suggested solution dominates the Directive
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to an even larger extent, in terms of deterrence effects. Hence, reducing the individual
liability of the first reporting firm as much as possible and allowing claimants to obtain
all the evidence collected during the administrative investigation is the optimal solution
to pursue the interests of both public and private enforcement.
We have then considered the case in which firms may go bankrupt and therefore
claimants cannot recover the entire awarded damages if the immunity recipient is not
liable. Our analysis shows that a conflict between deterrence and the victims’ right to
compensation may exist in this case. However, the EU and the US solutions remain bad
compromises; the Hungarian solution clearly dominates them as it performs better, as
far as deterrence is concerned, and never reduces the amount of damages that victims
can recover. Finally, we have argued that the trade-off between deterrence and the right
to compensation can be interpreted as a trade-off between the welfare of customers of
potential but deterred cartels, and the welfare of customers of actual cartels then re-
ported by one of the conspirators. On that basis, we have put forward some arguments
that support our claim that our proposal would entail a cost, in terms of expected re-
duced compensation of actual victims, that is largely outweighed by its benefit, which
is the full “compensation” of customers of potential cartels that are never damaged as
the cartels are effectively deterred.
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6 Appendix I
6.1 Calculation of the Nash products
Let us first “summarize” our dynamic game into a two by two matrix with the
expected payoffs in the four crucial states in Table 1. The collusive equilibrium is
“strategic risk dominant” if each firm’s equilibrium strategy is the best reply to the
other firm’s strategy of randomizing with equal probability between “Collude” and
“Report”.
We define the following value functions for the cases in which only the other firm
reports and when both report:19
VOR(C,R) = 0 − F − αRDOR




The game matrix is described in Table 1.
Table 1: Game matrix (1)
C j R j
Ci VNR,VNR VOR,VR
Ri VR,VOR VBR,VBR
By transforming the bimatrix-form of this game when agents establish a collusive
agreement, the best response equivalent matrix is as shown in Table 2 (see Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) for more details on this transformation).
Table 2: Game matrix (2)
C j R j
Ci VNR − VR,VNR − VR 0,0
Ri 0,0 VBR − VOR,VBR − VOR
The riskiness of the collusive agreement (γ) can be calculated using the “Nash
19When both firms deviate and report simultaneously, they will both set P = Pmonopoly − ε and split the
market, receiving Πdeviate = Π − ε. It is assumed that ε ' 0.
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products” of the two pure strategy equilibria. It can then be shown that collusion (C) is
“strategic risk dominated” by “reporting” (R) when:




− αRDBR + F + αRDOR)2 − [
Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)
1 − δ




− αRDBR + F + αRDOR + 2Π − αRDR >
Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)
1 − δ
↔ δ < δ∗ ≡ 1 −
Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)
3Π + F2 + α
R(DOR − DBR − DR)
δ∗ can also be expressed as:
δ∗ = 1 −
V ′NR
VBR − VOR + VR
where V ′NR is the numerator of VNR.








∂DR − 1][Π − ρ(F + α
NRDNR)]
[3Π + F2 + α
R(DOR − DBR − DR)]2
=
−2αR[Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)]
[3Π + F2 + α














)][Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)]
[3Π + F2 + α
R(DOR − DBR − DR)]2
=
[DOR − DBR − DR][Π − ρ(F + αNRDNR)]
[3Π + F2 + α
R(DOR − DBR − DR)]2
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6.3 Difference in discount factors
The relative change in the discount factors derived from the ICC and the analysis
of strategic risk, in the EU (II) and US solutions and our proposal is given by:
δ∗(III) − δ∗(EU,US )
δ∗(III)
>











































In the EU solution, i.e. scenario II, we have: αR(EU) = αNR < 1 and D = DR(EU) > 0,




















Π + ρ(F + αNRDNR)
Π + F2 + (2Π − α
NRD)
>
Π + ρ(F + αNRDNR) + (Π + F2 + D)
2Π − αNRD
The above condition is true when αNR is sufficiently small.
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Π + ρ(F + αNRDNR)
(2Π − DR(US )) + Π + F2 + D − D
R(US )
>
Π + ρ(F + αNRDNR) + (Π + F2 + D)
2Π − DR(US )
The above condition is true, provided that D
R(US )
D is sufficiently small.
6.4 Discount factors with T
The new value functions become:





VBR(T ) = VBR −
T
2
VR(T )(I) = VR − T ; VR(T )(II) = VR −
T
2
; VR(T )(III) = VR − 0
VOR(T )(I) = VOR − 0; VOR(T )(II) = VOR −
T
2
; VOR(T )(III) = VOR − T
As shown in subsection (6.1) in the Appendix, δ∗ can be expressed as:
δ∗ = 1 −
V ′NR
VBR − VOR + VR
(3)
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Therefore, the new discount factors are:
δ∗(I)(T ) ≡ 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
(VBR − T2 ) − (VOR − 0) + (VR − T )
= 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR − 3T2
δ∗(II)(T ) ≡ 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
(VBR − T2 ) − (VOR −
T




V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR − T2
δ∗(III)(T ) ≡ 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
(VBR − T2 ) − (VOR − T ) + (VR − 0)
= 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR + T2
The difference between the discount factors of scenarios III and II is:
δ∗(III)(T ) − δ∗(II)(T ) =
= 1 −
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR + T2
− 1 +
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR − T2
=
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR − T2
−
V ′NR − ρ
T
2
VBR − VOR + VR + T2
=
(V ′NR − ρ
T
2 )[VBR − VOR + VR +
T
2 − VBR + VOR − VR +
T
2 ]




V ′NRT − ρ
T 2
2
(VBR − VOR + VR)2 − T
2
4
The derivative of this difference with respect to T is:
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